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INTRODUCTION
Personality, popularity, and power. Can these three 
concepts be linked together in terms of the United Spates 
presidency? To my knowledge, no one has to date proposed a 
theory linking these three ideas. However, theories have 
been advanced which show direct links between each two of the 
three. A synthesis of the major theories I have discovered 
in present political science literature is as follows:
Several political scientists have written that a 
certain personality type in a President will lead to 
greater popularity. Others have identified a connection 
between a President's popularity and his ability to 
secure various powers. Finally, a few claim that a 
powerful President will consequently enjoy great 
popularity.
Digesting all of these hypotheses at once, in the 
format which I have presented them, can be a difficult 
procedure. Therefore, I will be working with the following 
diagram (developed by Professor Michael Krassa) throughout my
1
essay as I present my interpretation and evaluation of the 
above hypotheses as they have been advanced by prominent 
political scientists of the twentieth century. As the basis 
of my evaluation, I will be referring to the presidencies of 
John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.
Figure 1.
PERSONALITY---------- > POPULARITY---------- > POWER
A I
l~<---------- <---------- < ---------- |
2
CHAPTER ONE:
DEFINITION OF THE TERMS
To begin with, definitions of the terms "personality," 
"popularity," and "power" are necessary. I will not be 
working with the common, everyday meanings of these terms. 
Instead, I will be using operational definitions. By 
operational definitions I am referring to their connotations 
within a particular setting. More precisely, "operational 
definitions stipulate which specific indicators (or 
observations) are to be assigned which specific meanings" 
(Selltiz, 1976: 40). For the purposes of this thesis, the 
setting for the operational definitions of "personality," 
"popularity," and "power" will be defined with regard to the 
United States presidency.
PERSONALITY
First, the term "personality" refers to the publicly 
perceived image of a President. The setting of the United 
States presidency is characterized by an extremely 
promulgated public and private life. "Everything [the
3
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President] says and does (or fails to say, omits to do), 
becomes significant in everyone's appraisal regardless of 
the claims of his "officialdom" (Neustadt, 1976: 148). 
Americans not only see their President speaking to Congress 
on the state of the union, but they also see him taking his 
wife to the hospital for a masectomy. These reported images, 
public and private make up the perceived personality of the 
President. The American public receives these images through 
various mechanisms. The most significant ways in which the 
President's personality is conveyed is through television 
coverage of speeches and debates, newspaper and magazine 
articles, political advertisements, public statements made by 
others, and biographical books. Clearly, the American public 
perceives the personality of their President through the 
publicized reports of his public as well as his private life.
The types of public and private presidential activities 
which are reported determine the personality label a 
President will be given. For example, if the public is told 
that the President does not support the Social Security 
system, he will be perceived as a person who has little or no 
compassion for the elderly. On the other hand, if a 
President is shown speaking to teenagers about saying "no" to 
drugs, the public will see him as a man who is concerned 
about America's youth. With regard to private activities, if 
a President is shown playing with his children in the Oval 
Office, he will be viewed as a family man. However, if the
public learns that a President is keeping a mistress, he will 
be recognized as a man with little regard for his family.
Thus, the image the American public receives of their 
President, whether projected intentionally or 
unintentionally, helps determine the personality label he 
will be given.
I have narrowed a wide array of possible personality 
labels for a President down to three basic continua. At 
opposite ends of each continuum are contrasting personality 
types. The image a President projects is placed anywhere 
along each continuum. The placement depends upon the 
public's perception of the President, and consequently their 
opinion as to what type of personality he has. The three 
continua of personality labels for Presidents I will be 
using are as follows:
Figure 2.
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REFINED CRUDE
SPONTANEOUS CALCULATING
BIG SPENDER FISCAL CONSERVATIVE
Which end of each continuum is considered a positive
attribute and which is considered a negative attribute 
depends upon what the American public respects or desires at
that particular time. The public can be shown to have 
favored different personality types in different eras in 
American history. Wars, depressions, and national events are 
three contributing factors to what personality types are 
favored (Barber, 1972: 9). For example, Barber argues that 
in time of war, the public prefers a strong leader, but some 
aspects of such strength may not engender a positive 
evaluation in times of peace and prosperity.
For the purposes of this essay., I will be examining the 
era which includes the presidencies of John F. Kennedy,
Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nx /on. During this era, 
the American public responded positively to Presidents with 
refined yet spontaneous personalities. Furthermore, a big 
spender personality was received affirmatively during the 
early and middle 1960s. But by the beginning of the next 
decade, fiscal conservatism was desired in a President. So, 
for the era I will be focusing on, the personality labels of 
refined, spontaneous, and big spender (changed to fiscal 
conservative) were respected and desired by the American 
public. Therefore, these personality labels will represent a 
positive score on the above oontinua.
POPULARITY
Second, the operational definition of "popularity" in 
the United States presidency is the appreciation, admiration, 
and sometimes even adoration of the American public. A 
President who is popular reaps positive coverage by all forms
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of the media and is well-received in appearances throughout 
the country. In an operationalization of these concepts, 
popularity can be measured by opinion polls and election 
results. The elections which assess a President's popularity 
include both Presidential and Congressional elections. 
Congressional elections reveal public approval or disapproval 
of the President's party based on his performance thus far.
As Tufte explains, "it is reasonable to expect that voters 
upset by the performance of the President will take their 
dissatisfaction out on the congressional candidates of the 
President's party” (Tufte, 1978: 108). Congressional 
elections in an off-year are of special significance since a 
President's party almost always loses seats in an off-year. 
Because American voters "cannot change administrations at 
midterm elections, they can only express their approval or 
disapproval [of the administration] by returning or 
withdrawing legislative majorities" (Tufte, 1978: 106). So, 
in most cases, a gain or only a minimal loss of seats by the 
President's party indicates presidential popularity.
Plainly, presidential popularity is evidenced by high opinion 
poll ratings and election victories.
POWER
Finally, the ope national def inition of "power" in this 
thesis is the ability or capacity to exercise control or 
authority over Congress, the economy, and the media.
Obviously, a President may possess control over other
7
institutions or systems, but this thesis will fojus only upon 
these three major aspects of presidential power.
First, as Richard Neustadt has established, presidential 
power over Congress is essentially the power to persuade 
(Barber, 1972: 17). This power is exemplified in the 
ability to "push" particular measures through the 
institution. A President who is capable of winning 
Congressional approval of a controversial bill can be said to 
possess a certain amount of power. This power is the power 
to persuade and convince opponents to support a program and 
enact it into law. Clearly, presidential power over Congress 
refers to the ability to successfully persuade Senators and 
Representatives to vote for presidentially-initiated bills.
Second, presidential power over the economy is 
illustrated by the capacity to determine the timing of 
increases in transfer payments such as Social Security and 
veteran's benefits. A President can also exert power over 
the American economy by proposing a cut or postponing an 
increase in taxes and by mediating strikes and potential 
strikes (Tufte, 1978: 9). All of these measures have an 
effect on the real disposable income of Americans, and 
therefore affect the economy. Thus, through the manipulation 
of transfer payments and tax rates, and the mediation of 
strikes, a President can exercise considerable power over the
8
economy.
Third, presidential power over the media is typified 
by the ability to influence which news stories will be 
broadcast and which will not. Furthermore, a president may 
even be able to determine the type of news coverage he 
receives: positive or negative. The President controls
these aspects of the news in various ways. He may call pres 
conferences whenever he desires; he may release only those 
stories which he wants published; or, when a "leak” occurs, 
he may request that the press not publish the story. 
Moreover, the President may call journalists to the White 
House to cover a family gathering or some other positive 
activity of the president. Obviously, presidential control 
over what the media publicizes, and how it publicizes it, is 
presidential power over the media.
In order to actually use the operational def u\iuion of 
"power" in terms of the United States presidency, cxiteria 
of measurement must be established. There must be some 
grounds upon which to justifiably contrast the amount of 
power various Presidents possessed over Congress, the 
economy, and the media.
To begin with, an accepted standard of measure of 
presidential power over Congress is the percentage of bills 
successfully pushed through the two houses. A high 
percentage of presidentially-in.*tiated bills passed by 
Congress indicates a great deal of power. So, a President
with a high percentage of bills passed is considered to have 
possessed considerable power over Congress.
Next, one measurement of presidential power over the 
economy is the percentage change in real disposable income.
Nearly all Presidents have the power to manipulate the 
economy through the timing of transfer payment increases and 
tax rate changes, and many Presidents have the capacity to 
successfully mediate labor strikes. However, some Presidents 
are more adept at using these powers than others. Their 
skill can be measured in the size of the change in real 
disposable income. Therefore, all other things being equal, 
the President who can bring about the greater change in real 
disposable income can be considered as having more power 
over the economy.
Finally, two accepted measures of presidential power 
over the media are the percentage of news stories the 
President is able to suppress for any amount of time (of 
those we have eventually learned about) and the percentage 
of positive news stories published about him. A high 
percentage in either of these cases or both illustrates 
presidential power over the media.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE LINKS IN THE LITERATURE
Now that the operational definitions have been 
established for the three concepts which will be used, the 
theories linking them together shall be presented. The 
theories presented are my interpretations of theories which 
have been advanced by prominent political scientists of the 
twentieth century.
Each of the three theories linking the concepts of 
presidential personality, popularity, and power can be viewed 
individually as well as collectively. I will first present 
each hypothesis separately, and then I will consider them as 
a single model.
PERSONALITY ---- > POPULARITY
A certain personality type can enhance the popularity of 
a President. As defined earlier, "personality" refers to the 
publicly perceived image of a President, and "popularity" 
alludes to the appreciation, admiration, and sometimes even 
adoration of the American public. In order for this
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perceived image to command respect, it must be made up of 
attributes which are positively regarded by the public.
Obviously then, a President who displays these attributes to 
the public will be given a venerable personality label.
An affirmatively received personality label leads to 
high popularity in a very basic manner. If a President 
communicates the image the public desires, he will be well- 
liked. In other words, if the public admires a President who 
is refined and not crude, a President who is able to project 
refinement in his actions will be more likely to be popular.
The people will be more likely to respond positively in 
opinion polls and elections to the refined President than to 
the one who is crude. The President wins public approval by 
giving them what they want.
This theory linking presidential personality and 
popularity has been set forth by James Barber. In his brok,
The Presidential Character. Barber refers o the 
"presidential character" and how if is perceived by the 
American public. He states that ■ presidential character 
is a product of what the public sees of a President's 
political style (Barber, 19 2: 4). Furthermore, "a 
President's personality int© acts w.i; h the national 'dim; t 
of expectations' dominant at the timo he serves" (Barber,
1972: 6). Finally, Barber 1 uk specific politic a  styles 
and personality labels to opinion poll ratings. /hen a 
President acts derirably in a given situation, "t ere is a
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favorable spurt in the Gallup poll" (Barber, 1976: 5). As 
can be seen, James Barber has established the link between 
presidential personality and popularity.
POPULARITY-----> POWER
Presidential popularity can be linked to presidential 
power. This link is based on three sub-links connecting 
popularity with the three types of power: pc.wer over
Congress, the economy, and the media. Each of these 
connections have been advanced by various political 
scientists. In the following pages I will reveal the bases 
of these claims as well as the notable political scientists 
who advanced them.
Popularity ---- > Power Over Congress
First, presidential popularity carries with it 
presidential power over Congress. A President who is admired 
and respected by members of Congress will find it much easier 
to persuade than. They will be more willing to follow his 
requests if they respect, or even like, him. On the other 
hand, a President who is not respected by the Congressmen 
themselves can still exercise power over them. If the 
President has gained the respect and admiration of the 
American public, he will be capable of persuading Congressmen 
to support his policies. The reason for this is that a 
popular President has the electorate's backing, and most 
i >cted representatives do not want to go against the wishes
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of their constituents. Therefore, they provide support for 
the President's bills in order to fulfill their role of 
"representative” and, more pragmatically, to maintain their 
seat in Congress. Clearly, a President can use his 
popularity with the Congressmen themselves as well as with 
the American public as a tool to persuade Congressmen to 
support his policies.
Richard Neustadt has advanced the theory linking 
presidential popularity and power over Congress. In 
proposing this connection, Neustadt has also recognized 
popularity in terms of Congress as well as the American 
public. First, with regard to congressional popularity, he 
states that "their judgement of him is a factor in his 
influence with them" (Neustadt, 1976: 126). In other worus, 
his ability to persuade them to support his policies depends 
in part on what they think of him. If the Congressmen think 
highly of him, they are more likely to go along with his 
wishes. Secondly, Neustadt acknowledges that popularity with 
the American people can help a President wield power over 
Congress. In his book Presidential Power, he states that 
"his power stakes are not confined to his relationships and 
reputation inside Washington; his influence depends, as well, 
on his apparent popular prestige" (Neustadt, 1976: 153).
More specifically, "[Congressmen] also have to think about 
his standing with the public outside Washington. They have 
to gauge his popular prestige" (Neustadt, 1976: 154).
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Neustadt goes on to say that "because they think about 
it, public standing is a source of influence for him, another 
factor bearing on their willingness to give him what he 
wants" (Neustadt, 1976: 154). Plainly, Neustadt's 
establishment of the link between popularity and power over 
Congress can be summed up in hie statement that "[a 
President's] bargaining advantages in seeking what he wants 
are heightened or diminished by what others think of him" 
(Neustadt, 1976: 131).
Popularity ---- > Power Over The Economy
Second, presidential popularity can result in power over 
the economy. As stated earlier, presidential power over the 
economy rests heavily on the ability to control the timing of 
transfer payment increases and tax rate decreases, as well as 
the capacity to mediate strikes and potential strikes.
However, in order to implement these powers, the President 
must be popular. For example, to make changes in transfer 
payments or tax rates at the time desired, the changes 
themselves must first be approved by Congress. This is one 
point where popularity becomes important. A President who is 
popular will have the necessary backing to convince Senators 
and Representatives to go along with his requests. As a 
result, his economic proposals will be more likely to be 
passed by Congress and become law. Then the President will 
be able to implement them when he desires, and consequently 
w L have great control over the economy.
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Similarly, in order to successfully mediate a labor 
dispute, the President's proposal must be accepted by both 
sides. A President who is popular will find this task much 
easier. The reason is that people are much more likely to 
follow the wishes of a President who they respect and admire 
than one who is not popular. Therefore, a popular President 
can exercise control over the economy by mediating strikes. 
Plainly, popularity does increase the President's economic 
power.
This theory linking presidential popularity and power 
over the economy has also been advanced by Richard Neustadt.
With regard to power over the economy in terms of making 
changes in transfer payments and tax rates, Neustadt points 
out that one thing a President desires is the cooperation of 
Congress in "aiding him in attaining policy objectives"
(Neustadt, 1976: 159). These "policy objectives" may include 
raising real disposable income through increases in transfer 
payments and decreases in taxes. As stated earlier, Neustadt 
believes this Congressional cooperation is greatly determined 
by their opinion of the President. If they like him, they 
are much more apt to support his objectives. Consequently, 
his popularity can give him power over the economy.
Further, Neustadt feels that a President's power over the 
economy with regard to labor disputes is determined 
considerably by his popularity. He states that "status and 
authority yield bargaining advantages" (Neustadt, 1976:
16
104). Therefore, a President who is able to gain a view of 
status and authority from his public will be at a greater 
advantage in bargaining with them. Basically, a popular 
President can exert control over the economy by getting both 
sides of a labor dispute to respect his authority and 
consequently accept his proposal. As can be seen, Richard 
Neustadt has advanced the proposal linking popularity to 
power over the economy.
Popularity -----> Power Over The Media
Lastly, presidential popularity can affect his power 
over the media. This phenomenon can occur for two reasons.
First, a President who has the admiration of the American 
people as well as the media will be capable of persuading 
reporters to follow his wishes. In other words, when 
everyone respects the President, the media will be more 
likely to follow his requests to keep a story silent.
Second, the public's and the media's positive attitude toward 
the President will probably result in more positive coverage 
of him. If the media personnel admire a President, they will 
focus on his good points in their coverage of him.
Therefore, a President's popularity with the public and the 
media can lead to power over the media in the form of 
cooperation in following the President's requests and 
covering him in a positive manner.
This theory proposing that presidential popularity 
affects power over the media is briefly alluded to by Richard
17
Neustadt. In Presidential.Fower, he states that "the
prevalent impression of a President's public standing tends 
to set a tone and to define the limits of what Washingtonians 
do for him, or do to him" (Neustadt, 1976: 155). By 
"Washingtonians," Neustadt is referring to the media assigned 
to cover the President as well as government employees. He 
is simply saying that if a President is popular with the 
public, the media will cover him in a more positive tone and 
will be more likely to honor his requests. Apparently,
Richard Neustadt believes presidential popularity leads to 
power over the media.
P O W E R---- > POPULARITY
Just as there is a link running from presidential 
popularity to presidential power, so is there one running in 
the opposite direction. Presidential power can result in 
presidential popularity. This link can be founded on severe' 
bases. These bases center around the three types of power: 
power over Congress, the economy, and the media. Each of 
these presidential powers have been linked to popularity by 
various political scientists. In the following pages I will 
state the basic theory for the connection between each type 
of presidential power and its resulting popularity. I will 
also recognize the prominent political scientists who have 
advanced these theories.
18
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Power Over Congress ---- > Popularity
Presidential power over Congress can improve 
presidential popularity. Since power over Congress refers to 
the ability to "push" particular measures through the 
institution, in order for this power to result in popularity, 
these measures must be viewed as desirable by the public.
They must be policies which will have a positive effect on, 
or are supported by most Americans. Examples of 3uch 
policies may include stricter pharmaceutical drug testing 
laws, more rigid laws concerning air traffic controllers, and 
more stringent environmental laws. A President who proposes 
these types of measures, and secures their passage into law 
by Congress, receives the admiration of the public. His 
opinion poll ratings rise, and he secures electoral victories 
for himself and his party. Plainly, a President can 
transform his power over thu Congress into popularity.
Richard Neustadt has recognized the link between power 
over Congress and popularity. He explains the connection by 
stating that "his prestige turns on what the members of the 
public think they want and think they get. He affects their 
thoughts by what he does" (Neustadt, 1976: 175), Therefore, 
if what he does is successfully "push" popular measures 
through Congress, then his prestige with the public will 
improve. He will be more popular. Clearly, the theory 
linkii power over Congress and popularity is backed by 
Richard Neustadt.
Power Over The Economy---- > Popularity
Presidential power over the economy can increase 
presidential popularity. As stated in the definition, power 
over the economy refers to the capacity to determine the 
timing of transfer payment increases and tax rate changes and 
to successfully mediate labor disputes. Nearly everyone has 
strong feelings toward economic matters, especially those 
which "hit home." Most Americans like to see an increase in 
their real disposable income and a decrease in their taxes. 
Therefore, a President who is able to bring about either of 
these situations receives the appreciation of his public. He 
becomes popular.
This theory linking economic power and popularity has 
also been advanced by Richard Neustadt and Edward Tufte. 
Neustadt briefly alludes to this connection in Presidential 
Power. He explains that "paychecks and grocery bills are 
quite distinctly matters of real life" which affect the 
public's opinion of the President (Neustadt, 1976: 165-6). 
More specifically, Tufte establishes the connection between 
these two concepts in his book entitled PoliticalControl of 
the Economy. He states that "several studies have found that 
upswings in real disposable income per capita are highly 
correlated with greater electoral support for incumbents" 
(Tufte, 1978: 10). The studies on which he bases his claim 
on span four presidencies and cover the years of 1952 through 
1972. Tufte also cites Gallup opinion poll ratings which
reveal increases in presidential approval ratings following 
increases in real disposable income (Tufte, 1978: 115).
Clearly, the theory linking presidential control over the 
economy and popularity has been established.
Power Over The Media -----> Popularity
Presidential power over the media can yield presidential 
popularity. By controlling what the media broadcasts, and 
how it broadcasts it, a President can win the adoration of 
the American public. If the President is able to call great 
attention to accomplishments he has made, keep scandals from 
the public, and ensure he will always be seen in a positive 
light, the population will think highly of him. The American 
public will have no reason to believe otherwise. The media 
is their only real source of day-to-day information on the 
President. Therefore, if the President can exercise control 
over what the media broadcasts, then he can ensure his own 
popularity.
Richard Neustadt has also proposed this theory linking 
power over the media to popularity. He recognizes the fact 
that "[a President's] look in 'everybody's' eyes becomes 
strategically important for his influence” (Neustadt, 1976:
131). More precisely, how the media portrays the President 
to everybody is crucial in determining how everybody thinks 
of him. Therefore, presidential power over the media (the 
ability to influence which news stories are broadcast, which 
are kept silent, and how the President is covered) can
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im[Move presidential popularity. To support this claim,
Neu^tadt points out that "the professional reputation of a 
President in Washington is made or altered by the man 
himself" (Neustadt, 1976: 148). As a result, if the 
President controls the media, he has that much more capacity 
to control the professional reputation he is given.
SUMMARY
Clearly, the links between presidential personality, 
popularity, and power have been established. First, the 
connection between personality and popularity depends upon 
the particular era. For the time period I will be referring 
to, that which encompasses the presidencies of Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon, three main personality types were 
positively received by the American public. These 
personality types wore refined, spontaneous, and big spender 
(changed to fiscal conservative in the latter part of the 
time frame). Second, the link between popularity and power 
is based on persuasion. Popularity, as evidenced by election 
victories and high opinion poll ratings, provides a President 
with the power to persuade. This power can be exercised over 
Congress, the economy, and the media. Finally, power is 
connected to popularity by means of feedback. A President 
who exercises power over Congress, the economy, and the media 
receives positive feedback through electoral successes and 
improved opinion poll ratings. In other words, his power 
augments popularity. Therefore, each of the individual links
22
have bern established: personality leads to popularity,
popular ty yi< Ids power, and power produces popularity.
In the introduction to this thesis, I presented a 
diagram which displays each of these individual links as one 
collective unit. After having fully defined and explored 
each term and link, the diagram can now be supplemented with 
the various characteristics and bases for each concept and 
its connection with another. Hopefully, this will aid in the 
understanding of the theories linking each of these concepts 
in the United States presidency.
Figure 3.
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(ERA)
PERSONALITY---------- >
1) Refined
2) Spontaneous
3) Big Spender 
(later Fiscal 
Conservative)
(PERSUASION)
POPULARITY------------ >
1) Election wins
2) Opinion poll 
ratings
I
POWER
1) Over 
Congress
2) Over the 
economy
3) Over the 
media
Ij<-- -<------------- <--
(FEEDBACK)
CHAPTER THREE:
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
In the preceding pages I have presented several theories 
regarding the United States presidency as advanced by 
prominent political scientists of this century. Included in 
this presentation are definitions of the concepts involved, 
interpretations of the theories, and references to selected 
political scientists' establishment of these theories. 
However, this is not enough. These theories must be 
evaluated. They must be tested with regard to actual 
presidencies.
For the purpose of testing these hypotheses, I will 
referring to the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon. These three presidencies span 
the years of 1960 through 1974. This era in American history 
was characterized by a great deal of turmoil and change. It 
began with a sense of calmness and stability, but by the time 
Nixon resigned in 1974 much of that stability was gone. 
Americans had run the full gamut in terms of beliefs and 
views toward the presidency. Therefore, this era supplies a
24
iich variety of circumstances in which to test these 
hyi >theses.
My evaluation of each of these theories will consist of 
a recognition of the existence of the link as well an a 
measurement of its degree. 1 will rely upon accounts from 
varying sources for each of the presidencies in my tests of 
the links. Essentially, I will exemplify the links between 
personality and popularity, popularity and power, and power 
and popularity. Then, using the measurements defined 
earlier, I will assess the degree of each lick for the given 
Presidents. Thus, the t e s t ot these three hyped hoses will 
be comprised of a recognrt ion ot each link in at least one 
presidency of the era and a measurement of its significance.
PERSONALITY ■--> POPULARITY
As stated in the definitions, "personality” refers to 
the publicly perceived image of the President, and 
"popularity" is the appreciation, admiration, and possibly 
even adoration of the American public. However, the link 
between these two concepts depends upon the President's 
ability to convey to the public the image it desires. As 
James Barber has pointed out, several factors can determine 
the type of personality the public desires in a given era 
(Barber, 1972: 9). This was the case for the years spanning 
1960 to 1974, as economic, social, and international 
pressures resulted in three personality attributes being 
received favorably by the public. These attributes can be
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rich variety of circumstances in which to test these 
hypotheses.
My evaluation of each of these theories will consist of 
a recognition of the existence of the link as well as a 
measurement of its degree. I will rely upon accounts from 
varying sources for each of the presidencies in my tests of 
the links. Essentially, X will exeuplify the links between 
personality and popularity, popularity and power, and power 
and popularity. Then, using the measurements defined 
earlier, I will assess the degree of each link for the given 
Presidents. Thus, the testing of these three hypotheses will 
be comprised of a recognition of each link in at least one 
presidency of the era and a measurement of its significance.
PERSONALITY -----> POPULARITY
As stated in the definitions, "personality” refers to 
the publicly perceived image of the President, and 
"popularity" is the appreciation, admiration, and possibly 
even adoration of the American public. However, the link 
between these two concepts depends upon the President's 
ability to convey to the public the image it desires. As 
James Barber has pointed out, several factors can determine 
the type of personality the public desires in a given era 
(Barber, 1972: 9). This was the case for the years spanning 
1960 to 1974, as economic, social, and international 
pressures resulted in three personality attributes being 
received favorably by the public. These attributes can be
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summarized as embodied in a refined, spontaneous, big spender 
(changed to fiscal conservative toward the end of the time 
period). The counterparts to these personalities, crude, 
calculating, and fiscal conservative (later changed to big 
spender), were consequently viewed negatively in the eyes of 
the public. Therefore, the existence of the link between 
personality and popularity can be proven by showing 
Presidents who conveyed the former images were subsequently 
popular, and Presidents who communicated the latter images 
were not popular. This very thing can be done with the 
presidencies of the 1960s and early 1970s. In other words, 
the link between personality and popularity can be seen 
clearly in the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.
John F. Kennedy
The presidency of John F. Kennedy exhibited a positive 
link between personality and popularity. JFK successfully 
conveyed the personality Americans desired in the early 
1960s, and as a result he enjoyed great popularity.
At the beginning of the decade, the American public was 
looking for a change. "Currents of aberration, anxiety, 
frustration, and perhaps even boredom" were present in 
society (Toscano, 1978: 12). The Eisenhower years had 
initially been characterized by "flabbiness and self- 
satisfaction, " but with the succession of events which 
occurred both at home and abroad, Americans had changed their
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outlook. These events included the "rising tide of the 
struggle for Black equality" in America, anti-American 
protests throughout Latin America and Japan, and the 
launching of the Soviet Sputnik (Toscano, 1978: 10-11). By 
the presidential election of 1960, "a budding idealism was 
gathering to challenge the narrow materialism many saw in the 
Eisenhower years and the self-satisfaction produced by 
prosperity was undercut by a growing sense o apprehension 
concerning the directions America would take in the new 
decade" (Toscano, 1978: 10). As a result, Americans were
looking for certain qualities in the man they would elect to 
be their new President. These qualities were youth, 
urbanness, religion, ethnicity, and intellectualism. "So it 
was that John Kennedy, for the young, for the 'metro' 
American, for the Roman Catholic, for the ethnics, and for 
the academics, became a public figure who was seen as 
representing ideals and a style of leadership which touched a 
responsive chord among these diverse groups in American 
society" (Toscano, 1978: 13). And so it was that these 
qualities enabled John Kennedy to convey a sense of 
refinement, spontaneity, and big spending that would make him 
popular.
Kennedy exhibited these three qualities in his political 
and personal lifestyles. First of all, JFK displayed 
refinement in his political rhetoric. His elocution 
illustrated the fact that Kennedy was a rationalist and an
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intellectual. "He wanted political campaigns to be conducted 
like debates -- courteous but candid, friendly but frank, 
incisive without becoming inflammatory . . .," which is how
he spoke both before and after the i.960 presidential campaign 
(Barber, 1964: 32).
Kennedy was "cool, collected, courteous, and terse . . .
He kept his emotions under tight control. He did not lose 
his temper inadvertently . . . "  (Neustadt, 1976: 275). In 
many situations, "Kennedy was remembered not r ' much for what 
he said as for the impression of expertise, precision, and 
judgement he conveyed" (Barber, 1972: 315). Clearly, John 
F. Kennedy displayed a sense of refinement in his rhetoric.
Similarly, JFK exhibited refinement in his personal 
mannerisms. The son of self-made millionaire and United 
States ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy and Rose Fitzgerald 
Kennedy, the daughter of the Mayor of Boston, JFK was brought 
up well-versed in the social graces (Barber, 1972: 295) .
His three years at Harvard University and his one year 
studying abroad also enhanced his social charm. The American 
public witnessed this refinement in Kennedy's graceful wit 
and charm so commonly termed "charisma." From elegant tours 
of the newly restored White House with his gorgeous wife 
Jackie, to humorous, yet poignant, speeches to his people,
JFK was beautifully polished. As Richard Neustadt has 
pointed out, "his manners were impeccable, his charm
impelling” (Neustadt, 1976: 273). Obviously, Kennedy's well- 
learned elegance was reflected in his refined mannerisms.
The second of the desired qua!ities, spontaneity, could 
be seen in Kennedy's rhetoric as well as his decision-making. 
Kennedy displayed extemperaneousness while speaking on 
several occasions. This spontaneity was most likely to come 
out in the form of humorous quips directed either at himself 
or others. Its effect was usually to ease the tension of a 
situation, and was nearly always received positively 
(Neustadt, 1976: 275). This spontaneity also surfaced in 
Kennedy's immediate and public "shouldering of the blame" for 
the Bay of Pigs fiasco (Barber, 1972: 324). He did not 
attempt to hold off any public disclosure; he just told it 
like it was almost immediately after it occurred. In the 
area of decision-making JFK also exhibited a thoughtful 
spontaneity. He "dispJayed great eagerness to receive and a 
quickness to assimilate information. This tended, like a 
draft in a chimney, to pull decisions to the top," where he 
acted in a quick and determinate manner (Polsby, 1973: 135- 
6) .
This behavior can best be seen in an examination of the 
Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy quickly gathered all necessary 
information, met with his cabinet, and decided to impose a 
blockade, probably one of the biggest decisions made this 
century, all within five short days. When initially informed 
of the situation, the American public did not realize with
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what speed their President had made his decision. However, 
after the crisis was over, Americans were made aware of the 
swiftness Kennedy exercised in deciding upon the blockade, 
and were grateful for his ability to react quickly in a 
crisis. Plainly, JFK's spontaneity and decisiveness in 
rhetoric and decision-making was recognized and received 
positively by the public.
Finally, John F. Kennedy displayed the third quality, a 
tendency for big spending, in the policies he advocated.
Later dubbed as ’’the war against poverty, " Kennedy became 
active in promoting plans for an attack on chronic poverty 
during the course of 1963 (Neustadt, 1976: 270). Included 
in this attack were calls for "higher minimum wages, expanded 
health services, better housing, more protection for the 
aged, and perhaps family benefits like those adopted in 
Canada" (Burns, 1964: 23). And he intended to push for 
appropriations from Congress for these programs. He felt 
that sometimes a deficit budget is better if it enables us 
"to get this country moving again" (Wicker, 1968: 86).
Although few of these programs were implemented by Congress 
during his term, the American people knew he was pushing for 
them. Clearly, JFK advocated big spending policies during 
his presidency.
As can be seen, John F. Kennedy was successful in 
conveying to society the characteristics it desired in the 
early 1960s. The American public perceived his refinement,
30
spontaneity, and big spending tendencies and reacted 
positively. As a result, Kennedy enjoyed high approval 
ratings in the Gallup poll and Democratic gains in Congress.
In opinion polls, Kennedy experienced remarkably high 
approval ratings throughout his presidency. The public 
reacted to his personality with a popularity index average of 
70 percent approving, higher than all presidents in recent 
history including Franklin D. Roosevelt (Gallup Opinion 
Index, September 1974: 10). In particular, after the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco and Kennedy's immediate and public shouldering of the 
blame, "his Gallup poll rating leaped up to 82 percent”
(Barber, 1972: 324).
Kennedy's publicly perceived personality also yielded 
midterm election success for his party. In 1962, he was not 
only able to ’’prevent further Republican gains in the Eighty- 
Eighth Congress,” but also helped the Democrats to win 
additional seats in both houses (Wicker, 1968: 146). As 
evidenced by the high opinion poll ratings and midterm 
election wins, JFK was able to project the personality 
characteristics the people desired, and consequently he 
enjoyed great popularity with them.
Lyndon B. Johnson
When Lyndon B. Johnson took office in November of 1963, 
Americans still desired the same qualities in their president 
as they had for the last three years. They were looking for 
a refined, spontaneous, and big spending president. However,
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LBJ could not project, all three of these qualities as Kennedy 
had. He was neither as refined nor as spontaneous ar 
Kennedy. He possessed a dramatically different personality 
than his predecessor. Until the public was gradually made 
aware of this fact in 1966, LBJ enjoyed great popularity.
However, when Americans finally learned of his crude and 
calculating nature, his big spending social policies were not 
enough to save him. By the end of 1968, Johnson's popularity 
with the public had slowly but surely disintegrated.
On the personality continuum stretcl g from refined at 
one end to crude at the other, Lyndon Johnson would have to 
be placed nearer the crude end of the spectrum. In both his 
political and personal lifestyles he projected a sense of 
vulgarity. This vulgarity could be seen in his rhetoric and 
actions.
Rhetorically, Johnson used crude language to 
address all those around him. "Aides were showered with 
abuse when they were not showered with kindness. Johnson's 
private language by all accounts [was] expressive, earthy, 
anecdotal, and revealing" (Polsby, 1973: 164).
Similarly, LBJ was unrefined in his actions. "Men said 
he was flamboyant and a trickster. It was reported that he 
bullied his staff, and every reporter in Washington was 
familiar with stories of Johnson's personal vanity and 
occasional pettiness toward those who crossed him" (Wicker,
1968: 154). Moreover, LBJ had an aura of intimidation and
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shamele^ ass about him that made men feel that if they did 
not go aloiuj with him there would be ’’the most frightful and 
embarrassing row" (Reston, 1973: 166). Hin personality just 
was not refined: He was a "moody man and he si fered fits of
depression” (Kilpatrick, 1973: 197). Finally, Johnson was 
"blunt and intolerant of mistakes" (Reston, 1973: 167).
Although all of these crude actions did not take place in the 
public arena, the American people did eventually learn of 
their President's unrefined behavior, and Lyndon Johnson was 
consequently perceived as crude.
On the second personality continuum, ranging from 
spontaneous to calculating, Lyndon Johnson's personality was 
perceived as calculating. As mentioned earlier, he had a 
reputation for scheming, but his calculating went much deeper 
than that. LBJ kept a great deal of important information 
from the public. His purpose was to enable himself to twist 
the facts to fit the actions he would take. In fact, his 
attempts to manipulate and fool the public into support m y  
be interpreted as LBJ's own recognition that his power was, 
in part, determined by his popularity.
The best illustration of this is Johnson's management of 
the Vietnam War. He began by lying about what actually 
happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in order to win approval for 
his Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August of 1964. This 
resolution allowed Johnson to flex his muscles. "One of his 
aides said later that one of the President's purposes had
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been 'to win Republicans and conservatives with a responsible 
show of force'" (Wicker, 1968: 227). He accomplished his 
goal as his popularity rating jumped 14 percentage points 
just in time for the upcoming presidential election. LBJ had 
simply shaped the circumstances to fit his needs. He had 
carefully calculated just what had to be said in order to 
accomplish his goals.
This same sort o^ calculation persisted throughout the 
Vietnam War. For example, in a campaign speech on September 
25, 1964, Johnson exclaimed, "We are not going north and drop 
bombs at this stage of the game, and we are not going south 
and run out . . .  We are going . . .  to try to get them to 
save their own freedom with their own men . . . "  (Wicker, 
1968: 231-2). At the time he made this speech, LBJ was 
actually making plans, which he later carried out, for 
increase ? u.s. troop involvement in Vietnam. He purposely 
used m ding rhetoric like this in order to win the 
"Consensu > and therefore the election. Johnson even went so 
far as to deceive the public on the true cost of the war "for 
fear that Congress would cut the administration's domestic 
programs" (World Year Book. 1967: 23). Johnson's 
calculating nature was ultimately revealed to the public as 
"the President's official statements were widely questioned 
in the pros;" (World Year Book. 1967: 23). Due in part to 
this calculating image, Lyndon Johnson was not received 
positively by the American people at that time.
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Finally, although LBJ was able to project a big-spending 
image in his first few years, it was not enough to keep him 
afloat. Johnson pushed through Congress the publicly desired 
spending programs Kennedy had proposed before his death. 
However, his "Great Society" program could not sustain his 
popularity for long. During 1966 "he was criticized for 
neglecting the war against poverty as the costs of the war in 
Vietnam continued to rise" (World Year Book, 1967: 382).
And as he tried to maintain his commitment to America's urban 
and rural poor, middle-class opposition to any more social 
benefits for the nation's poor began to rise in full force 
(WorldYear Book, 1967: 382). Plainly, although it was a 
source of popularity early on, Lyndon Johnson's tendency 
toward big spending for social reform did not win him many 
popularity votes toward the end of his term.
As can be seen by examining Johnson's years in office, 
LBJ enjoyed a good deal of popularity until his true 
character was revealed to the public. Early on, he delighted 
in high approval ratings and, more significantly, an 
overwhelming victory in the 1964 presidential election. 
Johnson collected 486 electoral votes compared to his 
opponent Goldwater's 52 (Congressional Quarterly, 1979: 40). 
Furthermore, LBJ won 61 percent of the popular vote, the 
highest percentage up to that point in the history of United 
States presidential elections (CongressionalQuarterly.
1979: 33). However, the tide soon changed. "While the
President apparently retained overwhelming popular support 
across the nation, a 3mall but influential group of people 
who saw him up close were increasingly uneasy, unhappy, and 
uncharitable about him" (Otten, 1973: 194). It was not loner 
afterward that the American public also became aware of the 
"real" Johnson and reacted negatively to his true 
personality. During the last two years of his 
administration, LE J's approval ratings consistently fell.
After beginning his presidency with an appproval rating of 79 
percent in December of 1963, Johnson's popularity dropped as 
low as 35 percent in late August, 1968 (Gallup Opinion Index,
Oct. 1968: 5). In fact, Johnson's final average came to only 54 
percent, much lower than Kennedy's 70 percent rating (Gallup 
Opinion Index, Oct 1968: 5). Clearly, Lyndon Johnson's perceived 
personality of crude, calculating, and big-spending made him 
unpopular with the American people.
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon took office at a time when Americans 
were looking back in some perspectives and looking forward in 
others. After the crass and deceptive administration of 
Johnson, the public wished for a return to the refined and 
spontaneous ways of Kennedy. In contrast, following eight 
years of big-spending policies, the American people wanted to 
"put a lid on it." Governmental spending, both domestic and 
foreign, seemed to have gotten out of control, and as a 
result a fiscally conservative president was desired. So,
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the personality types received positively by the American 
people from 1968 to 1974 were refined, spontaneous, and 
fiscally conservative. Therefore, a moderately refined, and 
fiscally conservative Richard Hixon was able to secure a fair 
amount of popularity for some time.
The first personality characteristic, refinement, is not 
something which came naturally for Richard hixon. He was the 
son of an ex-trolley operator that seemed to try his hand at 
every trade in an effort to keep his family fed (Barber,
1972: 396). In Richard's young life the Nixon's spent 
several years struggling against genuine poverty (Barber,
1972: 396). As a result, Richard Nixon was not brought up 
with the social graces that children of upper class families 
were. Refinement was not naturally "bred" into him as it was 
for John Kennedy. Consequently, he had to work at being 
polished.
Through a great deal of personal effort, Richard Nixon 
was able to convey a moderate sense of refinement to the 
public. The most obvious area in which he displayed this 
quality was his "arms-length" style with those around him 
(Pierson, 1973: 206). He did not approach people with 
personal or degrading questions as Johnson had, but instead 
kept his distance and remained quiet and polite. Y,Nixon 
never castigated an underling, except perhaps in the inmost 
intimacy of his personal staff and his family. He was, 
moreover, compulsively unable to fire or dress down an aide"
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(Evans, 1971: 5). He simply just did not blew off steam at 
those around him.
The public was made aware of his refined mannerisms 
through the publishing of comments by those who dealt with 
Nixon. However, despite his polished manners, Nixon was 
never really perceived as having "the appearance of charm" by 
the American people (Evans, 1971: 4). "He waged an endless 
battle to overcome that lack, but the effort usually fell 
short. At the root of this incapacity was his loneliness, 
and the loneliness was partly an inheritance of birth in a 
poor and undistinguished family, partly his environment as a 
poor boy, partly the harsh way politics had dealt with him" 
(Evans, 1971: 4). He also lacked the wit and humor Americans 
had grown to love in Kennedy (Evans, 1971: 6). Clearly, 
although he lacked charm, Richard Nixon was able to 
communicate a basic sense of refinement to the American 
people through his behavior toward those around him, 
especially in contrast to his immediate predecessor, LBJ.
This consequently gave him a slight popular edge over LBJ 
when it came to personal style.
While Nixon was able to convey moderate refinement in 
his mannerisms, he was not capable of communicating the 
second desired personality trait: spontaneity. In the early
years it was not so much that he was calculating; it was just 
that he could not make any decisions spontaneously. Nixon's 
administrative style was composed of "order, privacy,
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thorough staff work, and plenty of homework for the President 
himself" (Polsby, 1971: 201). Nixon's style has bfcen 
described as "far more structured than Lyndon Johnson's," and 
rightly so (Semple, 1971: 204). He had a passion for 
organization. When an issue arose, Nixon would assign 
certain aides and those members of his Cabinet in the problem 
area to get all possible information regarding the issue. 
Then, before making a decison, Nixon would gather the results 
of interviewing and study, listen to debate by his advisors, 
and "retreat— sometimes to his oval office, more often to the 
Lincoln sitting room in the family quarters of the east wing 
— to make up his mind" (Semple, 1971: 203). His decision 
would finally come, but only after careful consideration of 
the options. Furthermore, Nixon "tended to concentrate on 
one issue at a time," which slowed down the entire decision­
making process of the administration even more. Plainly, 
Nixon was not known for spontaneity in his decision-making.
Although he may have only been perceived as 
"unspontaneous" in his early years, Richard Nixon went on to 
earn the reputation of calculating. The obvious reason for 
this is Watergate. This scandal revealed his calculating 
nature. The American people learned that their President had 
instigated unlawful activities for his own advancement, and 
devised lies to cover-up his participation. Moreover, he had 
installed a tape-recorder in his office to record 
conversations with unknowing participants. When the public
learned of these activities, it reacted with a drastic drop 
in presidential approval rating and the threat to impeach. 
Obviously, as the deceptive and calculating side of Richard 
Nixon was revealed to the public, his popularity disappeared.
Finally, Richard Nixon was able to convey a fiscally 
conservative image at a time when the majority of Americans 
desired this. Johnson's Great Society program and the 
Vietnam War had taken a heavy toll on the United States 
economy. By the year 1970 inflation was beginning to get out 
of control, and the American public was not pleased with its 
effects. In fact, some called the inflation "a crisis 
ripping at the innards of America" (Evans and Novak, 1971:
182). President Nixon reacted to this situation first by 
reducing former President Johnson's "uncuttable budget by 
four billion dollars" (Evans and Novak, 1971: 186) .
"Seemingly, Nixon had moved quickly and masterfully to bring 
the budget under control - an indispensable asset in his 
fight against inflation" (Evans and Novak, 1971: 187). In 
response to this action his popularity rose approximately six 
percentage points (Gallup Opinion Index, September, 1974:
12) .
Then, in mid-1971, he implemented a wage and price 
freeze to further curb inflation. This action was received 
positively by Americans as Nixon's popularity rating rose 
approximately four points (Gallup Opinion Index, August,
1974: 12). In a further attempt to control inflation, Nixon
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reduced federal spending by cutting back on social programs 
in early 1973. Though not as well-received as his wage and 
price freeze, this trimming of the budget was desired by the 
middle and upper class segments of society (Gallup Opinio 
Index, March 1973: 6). As a result, Nixon's popularity 
rating did not fall as drastically as it could have given the 
crisis state of inflation. Clearly, Nixon demonstrated 
fiscal conservativism in his attempts to curb inflation.
Since this was the publicly desired image at that time, Nixon 
enjoyed moderate popularity because of it.
As can be seen, Richard M. Nixon experienced a good deal 
of popularity early in his presidency as he conveyed a 
refined and fiscally conservative personality. In fact, his 
popularity peaked at 68 percent and did not drop below 53 
percent in his first four years in office (Gallup Opinion 
Index, September, 1974: 12). However, with the publication 
of his involvement in the Watergate scandal, Nixon's 
popularity tumbled. He was viewed as a scheming, calculating 
man, and the American people did not react to this 
positively. Richard Nixon's presidential approval rating 
dropped to an all-time low in United States history of 24 
percent (Gallup Opinion Index, August, 1974: 10). This 
figure is even more significant when one considers that of 
the 24 percent approving, only 13 percent strongly approved 
of the job the President was doing (Gallup Opinion Index, 
September, 1974: 13). As mentioned earlier, a threat to
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impeach President Nixon arose, but he resigned from office 
before the threat could be carried out. Clearly, while 
enjoying moderate to good popularity early on, due to his 
refined and fiscally conservative image, Richard Nixon lost 
the admiration of the American people when his calculating 
nature was revealed.
SUMMARY
The three personality continue -- refined to crude, 
spontaneous to calculating, and big spender to fiscal 
conservative —  have all been identified for the era of 1960 
to 1974. In this era, refinedness, spontaneity, and big 
spending (changed to fiscal conservatism in late 1966) were 
seen as positive attributes, while their counterparts were 
viewed negatively.
The three Presidents of this era, Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Nixon, can be measured in terms of these personality 
continua. This measurement is best understood in a placement 
of these Presidents on each continuum according to the degree 
in which they possessed a given attribute. Shown below is a 
chart identifying each attribute as well as the degree to 
which Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon exemplified 
them.
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F i g u r e  4.
REFINED CRUDE
(+) (-> |-K--------N------------- J-|
SPONTANEOUS CALC J LA TING
<+) <“ )|-- K---------------- j---N- |
BIG SPENDER
(+/-)l-J-- K
FISCAL CONSERVATIVE 
<-/ + )------N-~ I
Legend:
K « John F. Kennedy's placement on each continuum 
J = Lyndon B. Johnson's placement on each continuum 
N » Richard M. Nixon's placement on each continuum
POPULARITY---- > POWER
Popularity is the appreciation, admiration, and 
sometimes even adoration by the public. Power is the ability 
or capacity to exercise control or authority over Congress, 
the economy, or the media. The link between these two 
concepts is persuasion: popularity enables a President to
exercise the power of persuasion in these three areas. 
Therefore, a President who is popular will enjoy great power.
This is the basic hypothesis behind the theory linking 
popularity and power. In order to test this hypothesis, it 
must be shown that a popular President is able to push bills 
through Congress, effectively control the timing of economic 
measures, successfully mediate labor disputes, and
influence the broadcast of news stories. In examining the 
presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon this theory holds 
true. A President who enjoys popularity, enjoys power over 
Congress, the economy, and the media.
Popularity ---- > Power Over Congress
As Richard Neustadt has stated, "[a President's] 
bargaining advantages in seeking what he wants are heightened 
or diminished by what others think of him" (Neustadt, 1976: 
131). So, a President who is popular with either the members 
of Congress, the American public, or both will have the 
capacity to push controversial bills through Congress. This 
theory successfully withstands the test with regard to the 
presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson.
As established earlier, Lyndon Johnson was a popular 
President during his early years. As a result, he was able 
to exercise a great deal of power over Congress. The most 
obvious pieces of evidence of this are his numerous social 
programs collectively called the Great Society program.
After winning "an overwhelming mandate" from the people in 
the 1964 presidential election, Johnson recognized that he 
could "swing Congress decisively" (Wicker, 1968: 231). His 
great popularity enabled him to persuade Congress to adopt 
his vast social programs. In fact, "in the early months of 
1965, it could fairly be said that no President - save 
possibly F.D.R. in 1933, in vastly different circumstances - 
had disposed of so much sheer political power, or faced such
a limitless future of achievement, as did Lyndon Johnson"
(Wicker, 1968: 234). The reason being that he was popular.
"'No matter how sophisticated a guy is, he's flattered 
and impressed by attention from the President of the United 
States,' says a very sophisticated Senate Democrat" (Otten,
1973: 189). The above statement was made in April of 1965, 
and acc rately reflects the feelings of the majority of 
Congressmen toward President Johnson. Over 500 of the 535 
invited Senators and Congressmen attended the President's 
evening briefings and buffets at the White House; nearly all 
of them taking advantage of the opportunity to have their 
picture taken with the President and First Lady (Otten,
1973: 191). While ma.iy of them attended because they liked 
President Johnson and were honored to accept his invitation, 
some of the Congressmen may have accepted merely to present a 
good image of themselves, with regard to their relationship 
with the President, to the Johnson-adoring public.
Similarly, Johnson's "invitations” to support his programs 
were accepted by most Congressmen, and for many of the same 
reasons. Either a Congressman liked and respected LBJ enough 
to support his policies, or his constituents felt strongly 
enough about the President to compel him to give his support.
Thus, a President who is well-liked by members of 
Congress and/or the general public will be capable of 
persuading Congressmen to support his policies. As shown by 
his high approval ratings and the size of his overwhelming
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election victory, Lyndon Johnson was popular in his early 
years as President. Due to this popularity, he was able to 
get his Great Society program passed. This was an incredible 
accomplishment considering the vastness of the program and 
the controversial nature of some of its aspects. However, 
through his popularity with individual Congressmen as well as 
the American people as a whole, President Johnson had the 
power to see his program through.
Clearly, the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson exemplifies 
the link between presidential popularity and power over 
Congress. In the first three years of his presidency,
Johnson's popularity with both members of Congress and the 
public yielded him considerable power over Congress. His 
high approval ratings and overwhelming election victory 
enabled him to get his Great Society program through 
Congress. Therefore, the link has been confirmed with regard 
to the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson: presidential
popularity has a positive correlation to power over Congress.
Popularity ---- > Power Over The Economy
The theory linking presidential popularity to power over 
the economy has been advanced by Richard Neustadt. He 
advocates this theory on two bases. He states that 
popularity with both Congressmen and the American public 
leads to power over the economy* Popularity with these two 
groups of people enables a President to get crucial economic 
measures through Congress. Also, popularity with Americans
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in general can aid a President in settling an important labor 
dispute. These two activities, pushing economic measures 
through Congress and mediating labor disputes, each have 
significant effects on the economy. They both can play a 
role in determining real disposable income. This link 
between presidential popularity and power over tne economy is 
best exemplified in the presidencies of Richard M. Nixon and 
John P . Kennedy.
Richard Nixon enjoyed substantial popularity in his 
first five years in office. He won convincingly over 
Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election and McGovern in 
the 1972 election. Moreover, his approval rating peaked at 
68 percent in November of 1969 and January of 1963 (Gallup 
Opinion Index, September 1974: 10). This popular standing 
enabled Nixon to push through Congress several major economic 
measures.
Although inflation was a weighty problem which tugged at 
President Nixon's popularity, he was able to sustain a 
popular standing sufficient to ensure the passage of his 
controversial price-wage controls in January of 1969 (Evans 
and Novak, 1971: 185). At this point in his term, Nixon was 
popular with both Congress and the American people. His 
overall approval rating was 59 percent (Gallup Opinion Index. 
January, 1969: 1). In terms of real disposable income, this 
measure did not actually bring about an increase. Afterall, 
wages were frozen to their current rate. However, by also
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freezing prices, inflation was held in check and real 
disposable income remained constant. Therefore, instead of 
declining, as it had been in previous months, American's real 
income continued to buy what it had been. Clearly, Nixon's 
popularity in early 1969 enabled him to exercise some control 
over the economy through his wage and price freeze measure.
Also, many Americans responded to some of Nixon's 
"jawbone appeals" to keep prices, spending, wages, etc. under 
control. The fact that the public did respond is a sign of 
his popularity. Thus, popularity is directly linked to power 
over the economy in this instance.
With regard to popularity leading to power over the 
economy in the form of successfully negotiating labor 
disputes, we can look to the presidency of John 7. Kennedy.
In 1962, a showdown between the AFL-CIO and the steel 
companies had come to a head (World Year Book. 1963: 422).
At this time, Kennedy's approval rating was high.
Consequently, he ws able to use this popularity, especially 
with laborers, to negotiate a settlement between the two 
sides. By getting the steel industry to roll back a price 
increase, JFK saved the United States' economy from certain 
damage (Evans and Novak, 1971: 184). Therefore, President 
Kennedy's popularity yielded him power over the economy.
As has been shown, the link between presidential 
popularity and power over the economy existed in the
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presidencies of Richard Nixon and John Kennedy. Thus; the 
theory holds true in these instances.
Popularity-----> Power Over The Media
Richard Neustadt has advanced a theory linking 
presidential popularity and power over the media. He states 
that, "the prevalent impression of a President's public 
standing tends to set a tone and to define the limits of what 
Washingtonians [including media personnel assigned to 
Washington] do for him, or do to him" (Neustadt, 1976: 155). 
Therefore, a President who is popular will be covered in a 
positive manner by the media, and he will be capable of 
exercising considerable influence over the media as to what 
is broadcast and what is not.
This connection between presidential popularity and 
power over the media can be shown to have existed in the 
presidency of John F. Kennedy. Kennedy enjoyed tremendous 
popularity while in office. His approval rating reached a 
high of 83 percent and a very respectable low of 57 percent 
(Gallup Opinion Index, September 1974: 10). Moreover, his 
average approval rating was an unprecedented 70 percent.
Finally, Kennedy's popularity was exhibited by Democratic 
gains in Congress in the 1962 midterm election. Obviously, 
President Kennedy was popular.
This popularity led to power over the media in two ways. 
First of all, JFK was able to convince the media to keep 
certain stories silent for a specific period of time. One
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good example of this is the Cuban Missile crisis. President 
Kennedy persuaded the media to withhold from the public any 
information it had on the situation until he could tell them 
himself. Obviously/ the media was not required to keep the 
story silent/ but news personnel respected Kennedy and went 
along with his wishes.
Second/ the media covered President Kennedy only in a 
positive light. It brought to the public's attention 
Kennedy's good points and rarely exposed his bad. This 
resulted in the "Camelot" image. In fact/ " 'President 
Kennedy's public image,' declares Lashy, 'clashed mightily 
with his private life. The public image, presented through 
an all-too-willing media, was that of the good husband, the 
kind family man, and the perfect father. Camelot was never 
sullied by what really was going on behind the scenes, the 
sybaritic, hedonistic life led by a President who felt he 
could do anything and get away with it' " (Smith, 1980:
113) .
Malcolm Smith goes on to state, "The reason this side 
was rarely revealed to the public is that Kennedy managed the 
news. He kept good relations with many reporters . . .
(Smith, 1980: 143). Clearly, John F . Kennedy's popularity 
with the American people, and with the media in particular, 
enabled him to exercise power over the media.
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POWER-----> POPULARITY
Two links exist between popularity and power. The first 
runs from popularity to power and has been discussed in the 
preceding pages. The second, running from power to 
popularity also can be demonstrated. The link for this 
variation of the connection between presidential power and 
popularity is feedback. The public's reaction to various 
acts of power performed by the President is the feedback 
which determines a change, if any, in his popularity. In 
most cases, the President uses his power in such a manner as 
to increase his popularity. Thus, presidential power over 
Congress, the economy, and the media can load to presidential 
popularity.
For the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Hixon, 
this theory doos hold true. Each President exhibits a 
different type of power which leads tc increased popularity 
for him.
Powor Over Congress ---- > Popularity
Power over Congress refers to the ability to "push" 
particular measures through the institution. However, in 
order for this power to result in popularity, these measures 
must be viewed as desirable by the public. They must be 
policies which will have a positive effect on, or are 
supported by, most Americans. President Johnson's social 
programs and policies collectively, termed "the Great 
Society," were a prime example of this. As a result, his
power over Congress in getting this program passed won him 
great popularity.
Johnson's Great Society program was desired by a 
majority of Americans. Its provisions included federal aid 
to the poor through the growth of welfare, major public 
initiatives in health care, federal housing projects, 
economic developments in the black community, and federal aid 
to education (Ginzberg and Solow, 1974: i-ii). Clearly, 
these programs promised relief for various segments of 
society. From helping the poor through welfare to aiding 
middle-class students in gaining a college education, the 
Great Society program was desired by the majority of 
Americans.
Despite the program's popularity, it was still difficult 
to steer it through Congress. The program was vast, complex, 
and far-reaching. Furthermore, each individual measure which 
made up the program had to be voted on separately. Thus, it 
required a great deal of lobbying on President Johnson's part 
to get the program passed largely intact. However, LBJ 
possessed enough power over Congress to secure the Great 
Society's passage in only two years (Ginzberg and Solow,
1974: 8) .
As a result of President Johnson's power over Congress 
and his ability to get his programs passed, he was able to 
maintain consistent popularity with the American people.
From early 1964 to late 1965, the time period in which
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Johnson was pushing the bulk of the Great Society program 
through Congress; his popularity rating averaged 69.7 percent 
(Gallup Opinion Index, February, 1966: 3). More 
significantly, Lyndon Johnson won an incredibly lopsided 
presidential election in 1964. As Richard Neustadt stated,
"[the President's] prestige turns on what the members of the 
public think they want and think they get" (Neustadt, 1976:
175). Obviously, the theory linking presidential power over 
Congress and popularity is lent credibility by Lyndon Johnson 
and his Great Society program.
Power Over The Economy -----> Popularity
Power over the economy was defined earlier as the 
capacity to determine the timing of transfer payment 
increases and tax rate changes and to successfully mediate 
labor disputes. Theories linking this power to presidential 
popularity have been advanced by Richard Neustadt and Edward 
Tufte. Neustadt explains that "paychecks and grocery bills 
are quite distinctly matters of real life" which affect the 
public's opinion of how well the President s performing his 
job (Neustadt, 1976: 165-6). More specifically, Tufte 
states that "several studies have found that upswings in real 
disposable income per capita are highly correlated with 
greater electoral support for the incumbents" (Tufte, 1978:
10). Therefore, if a President is able to control those 
aspects of the economy pertaining to real disposable income,
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he will find it easier to increase or maintain a high 
popularity rating.
President Richard M. Mixon was able to do just that. He 
was able to control the timing of increases in transfer 
payments so as to increase real disposable income and 
consequently his popularity. One source of evidence for 
this involves President Nixon's support of a social security 
benefit increase bill passed by Congress and his suosequent 
signing of it in October of 1972. After winning 
Congressional approval of the bill and signing it into law,
Nixon ordered his administration to send out notices 
explaining that the 20 percent increase in their benefit 
check Mwas due to a new law 'enacted by the Congress and 
signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon' " (Tufte,
1978: 31). The note went on to say, "The President also 
signed into law a provision which will allow social security 
benefits to increase automatically if the cost of living goes 
up" (Tufte, 1978: 32). Thus, President Nixon was able to 
exercise power over the economy through his ability to 
control the timing of those increases in real disposable 
income deriving from Social Security payments.
This increase in real disposable income helped bring 
Nixon great popularity with the American people. The most 
obvious manifestation of this is Nixon's overwhelming 
presidential election win over McGovern in 1972. Nixon 
captured 520 electoral votes compared to McGovern's 17
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(Congressional Quarterly, 1979: 60). His approval 
rating also correlated positively with this power as he 
reached his high of 66 percent in January of 1963 (Gallup 
Opinion Index, September 1974: 10). Clearly, the link 
between presidential power over the economy and popularity 
can be shown to exist in the presidency of Richard M. Nixon.
Power Over The Media ---- > Popularity
Presidential power over the media can lead to 
popularity. By controlling what the media broadcasts, and 
how it broadcasts it, a President may win the adoration of 
the American public. More specifically, if a President is 
able to call great attention to accomplishments he has made, 
keep scandals from the public, and ensure he will always be 
seen in a positive light, the population will think highly of 
him. In the case of President John r. Kennedy, his power 
over the media enabled him to increase his popularity even 
more.
JFK exercised power over the media in two different 
areas. First of all, he was able to control, to an extent, 
when certain news stories would be broadcast. For example, 
when the Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred, President Kennedy 
persuaded the media to withhold news of the event until he 
had a chance to go before the American people and explain it 
to them himself. The result was that the President's 
Gallup poll rating actually leaped to 82 percent instead of 
drastically falling, as would have been predicted (Barber,
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1972: 324). Second, President Kennedy had the capacity to 
determine the way in which he would be portrayed to the 
public * From inviting reporters to the Oval Office to 
photograph him playing with his two children, to accompanying 
his beautiful wife Jackie on the nationally televised tour of 
the newly renovated White House, JFK ensured his portrayal as 
a devout family man. Clearly, President Kennedy exercised 
substantial control over the news.
Kennedy managed the news by keeping good relations with 
many reporters and lashing out (privately) against those who 
wrote unfavorably of him (Smith, 1980: 143). This "lashing 
out" consisted of "cancelling subscriptions to the White 
House, verbal abuse and beratement from Bobby (then Attorney 
General), and of [having] reporters' taxes audited" (Smith,
1980: 143).
Kennedy's management of the news definitely led to 
popularity. His perfect timing in his release of the news of 
the Bay of Pigs fiasco meant an increase in his approval 
rating rather than the expected decrease (Barber, 1972:
324). Furthermore, his perfect orchestration of the Camelot 
image presented to the American people produced the highest 
average approval rating in recent history (Gallup Opinion 
Index. September, 1974: 10). As can be seen, President 
Kennedy's power over the media resulted in popularity for 
him.
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At the start of this thesis, I set out to show that 
certain aspects and evaluations of presidential performance 
are linked. These links involve the personality, popularity, 
and power of a President. While all of these links may have 
previously been advanced in political science literature, I 
substantiated and illustrated each individual link with 
evidence from the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.
I accomplished what I set out to do by demonstrating 
that a connection exists between the personality of each of 
these Presidents and their popularity. This connection, 
however, depends upon the type of personality desired in a 
given era. Furthermore, I demonstrated that the level of 
popular support of Kennedy,. Johnson, and Nixon directly 
influenced their power over Congress, the economy, and the 
media. Finally, I established that the exercise of 
presidential power in any of these three areas yielded a 
degree of popularity for the President. Plainly, each of
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these links between personality, popularity, and power has 
been shown to exist in the United States presidency.
However, these links are not meant to be considered 
solely in an individual sense. They are simply pieces which 
fit together to form a system of interdependent 
relationships. Each is affected by the other, either 
directly or indirectly, and therefore each can be linked 
together. As a result, they should ultimately be considered 
as one explanation for certain aspects of the United States 
presidency.
From personality, to popularity, to power, and 
back to popularity, each characteristic of a President 
produces, or is the product of, other characteristics. In 
essence, these aspects of the presidency are related in a 
cyclical manner. One characteristic leads to another, which 
leads to another, which leads back to the second. Thus, if a 
President is fortunate enough to possess one of these 
qualities, he may be able to use it to gain the others, or 
simply reinforce what he already has. For example, a popular 
President may use his popularity to gain power over the 
media, which in turn can have a positive effect on his 
popularity, which consequently may enhance his power over 
Congress, and so forth. On the other hand, if a President 
does not possess a certain characteristic, he may find that a 
breakdown will occur in the attributes he already has. For 
example, a popular President who does not possess power over
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the media may find that this lack of power will result in a 
breakdown of what he already has: popularity. As can be
seen, a cyclical relationship exists between these links in 
the presidency.
Clearly, personality, popularity, and power make up a 
system of interdependent relationships in the United States 
presidency. The links of this system have been advanced by 
prominent political scientist, and shorn to have existed in 
the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Therefore, 
a President possessing one of these attributes is capable of 
gaining the others. However, if a President does not possess 
any of these characteristics to begin with, will he ever be 
able to win any of them? Can he ever break into the 
"system?"
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